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Conrad: Contract Law

ARTICLE
WOLF AND WILHELMINA: GIVING
ENTERTAINERS A LICENSE TO BREACH
THEIR CONTRACTS
Mark Conrad *

In recent years, high-priced entertainers and personalities
have been the object of intense demand, resulting in lucrative
personal services contracts. Such individuals - who have become "hot property" in their various fields - have been in the
enviable position of being courted and enticed by many prospective employers or managers. Sometimes, these entertainers will
be lured by rivals and will breach their existing contracts to sign
a more lucrative agreement. 1
Two New York cases, Wolf v. American Broadcasting Companies 2 and Wilhelmina Models v. Abdulmajid,3 point out the
problems that employers or managers face when their prize employees breach contractual obligations, and demonstrate the failure of conventional contract remedies to make these employers
or managers "whole." Both cases involve well-known employees
of major entertainment organizations, who breached their contracts and jumped to competitor organizations, and both deci* Assistant Professor, Baruch College, City University of New York; B.A., City College of New York, 1978; J.D., New York Law School, 1981; M.S., Columbia University,
Graduate School of Journalism, 1982. Admitted to the New York and District of Columbia Bars.
1. See Motown Files $1 Million Law Suit Against Teena Marie, JET MAGAZINE, Aug.
30, 1983, at 53; Gaff Sues Rod Stewart, Claiming Management Puberty Parts are Valid,
Variety, May 19, 1982, at 111; Eddie Murphy Asks Court to Void Old Contract, JET
MAGAZINE, June 3, 1985, at 38.
2. 52 N.Y.2d 394, 420 N.E.2d 363, 438 N.Y.S.2d 482 (1981).
3. 67 A.D.2d 853, 413 N.Y.S.2d 21 (1st Dept. 1979).
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sions fail to grant effective breach of contract remedies against
the employees.
Parts I and II of this article will discuss the Wolf and Wilhelmina cases. Part III will describe the equitable contract remedies of specific performance and injunctions for breach of a personal services contract. Part IV will discuss a proposed new
standard to permit the award of special damages that may provide a more effective remedy for future breaches of contract.
I.

WOLF v. AMERICAN BROADCASTING COMPANIES

Since coming to New York in 1976, Warner Wolf has become something of a fixture in local television news. Described
as a "sports personality,"· Wolfs colorful delivery of the day's
sports events with glib, cliched phrases!! has made him a very
popular television personality.
Wolf was employed by WABC-TV from 1976 to 1980, when
he joined WCBS-TV, a competitor station and a co-defendant in
the case. Wolfs contract with WABC contained a "first negotiations/first refusal" clause that required Wolf to enter into goodfaith negotiations and prohibited the sportscaster from negotiating "with any other person or company other than WABC-TV or
ABC"6 for a period of 45 days of a 90-day "renegotiation" period
preceding the contract's expiration date of March 5, 1980. Also,
the clause provided that if Wolf and ABC could not reach agreement for an extension of the contract, Wolf was obligated not to
accept employment as a sportscaster without first giving ABC an
opportunity to employ him on substantially similar terms. 7 Only
if ABC failed to offer him a similar contract, was Wolf free to
accept the other offer.
4. See N.Y.Times, Schwartz, June 12, 1980, § III, at 19, col. 1.
5. Wolf frequently cries "Let's go to the videotape" before narrating the highlights
of a particular match. Also, he uses the term "swish" to describe a deft basketball shot
and "boom" to describe a home run in a baseball game.
6. See American Broadcasting Companies v. Wolf, 76 A.D.2d 162, 163-64, 430
N.Y.S.2d 275, 277 (lst. Dept. 1980). WABC-TV is owned and operated by the American
Broadcasting Companies (ABC) now a division of Capital Cities Braodcasting and
WCBS-TV is owned and operated stations by CBS.
7. 76 A.D.2d at 164, 430 N.Y.S.2d at 277.
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Although Wolf was obligated by the terms of the contract
not to negotiate with a rival employer during the first part of the
renegotiation period, the sportscaster did just that. Unbeknownst to ABC, Wolf met with representatives of WCBS-TV
on several occasions, some of the meetings taking place even
before the 45-day exclusive period began. s Those meeting ultimately resulted in Wolfs decision to resign from WABC and accept an offer at the rival station.
During that time, Wolf met with ABC officials, who on February 1, 1980 reluctantly accepted the sportscaster's demand for
a three year contract at an annual compensation of $400,000,
$450,000, $500,000. 9 Yet, Wolf refused to accept the offer because of ABC's delays in getting back to him and told ABC that
his lawyer advised Wolf to "see what the other options are."lO
On February 4th, Wolf agreed to the terms offered by CBS,
which provided a two year contract at $400,000 and $450,000 per
year. l l and which had an exclusivity clause that barred him from
offering any renewal of the contract with ABC.12 Wolf did not
tell ABC about his contractual arrangements with WCBS-TV. In
fact, the arrangements were not disclosed until the action had
8. According to the decision, Wolf met with WCBS-TV representatives on at least
four occasions: October 4, 1979, October 16, 1979, February 1, 1980, and February 4,
1980. During those meetings, employment possibilities with WCBS-TV were discussed
and by the final meeting, contracts were presented. Also on February 4th, CBS and Wolf
agreed to an irrevocable option letter providing that in return for $100 paid by Wolf
"WCBS-TV agrees to hold open its offer of employment under the terms and conditions
set forth in the attached draft agreement until June 4, 1980 and WCBS-TV shall not
withdraw such offer prior to that date." [d. at 166,430 N.Y.S.2d at 278-279.
9. [d. at 165, 430 N.Y.S.2d at 278.
10. [d.

11. Wolf actually agreed to two separate contracts, the first an 18-page sportscaster's
agreement, and the second, an contract to produce sports specials (known as a "producer's agreement") consisting primarily of sixteen half-hour football specials for an initial pay period of thirteen weeks followed by a two-year term. The salary of $400,000 for
the first year and $450,000 for the second year, was to be divided equally between the
two agreements. [d. at 162, 430 N.Y.S. at 278.
12. The clause, which was in the producer's agreement, stated:
"Artist's services shall be completely exclusive to CBS during
the term of this Agreement, and during such term Artist will
not perform services of any nature for, or permit the use of
Artist's name, likeness, voice or endorsement by, any person,
firm or corporation, or on Artist's own account, without Station's prior approval, which approval shall not be unreasonably withheld."
Id. at 165, 430 N.Y.S.2d at 279 (emphasis added).
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been commenced. 13 Wolf accepted WCBS-TV's offer with one
month still left in the 90-day renegotiation period.
In subsequent meetings with ABC representatives, Wolf did
not mention his commitment with WCBS-TV but advised his
employer that he would not stay at the station, and that on June
4, 1980, he was free to commence employment elsewhere. 1. Although suspicious that Wolf might have made a deal in violation
of the right of first negotiations/refusal clause, ABC, did not
commence action until May 6th, by which time, Wolfs switch to
WCBS-TV was a matter of public knowledge. Iii
ABC sought injunctive relief barring Wolf from working at
WCBS-TV and specific performance of the contract with ABC
by a direction that Wolf submit CBS's offer of employment to
ABC to be matched. 16 ABC alleged that Wolf, induced by CBS,
breached both the good-faith negotiation and first refusal provisions of the contract. Strangely, ABC's claim failed to state any
claim for damages, relying solely on equitable relief.
The supreme court issued a preliminary injunction, prohibiting Wolf from work for WCBS-TV, but dismissed the action
six days later.17 An expedited appeal to the Appellate Division
ensued.
In a 4-1 ruling, the Appellate Division concluded that although Wolf breached the aforementioned provisions, equitable
intervention was unwarranted. Although castigating Wolf for deliberately breaching his obligations to ABCls and CBS for induc13.Id.
14. June 4th was the day after the first-refusal period ended. On February 22nd,
Wolf and ABC made an agreement covering Wolfs employment for the 90-day firstrefusal period which ran until May 28th. Id. at 166, 430 N.Y.S. at 280.
15.Id.
16.Id.
17. The preliminary injunction was issued on June 3, by Justice Burton Sherman.
The complaint was dismissed on June 9.
18. The court stated:
At the time the February 4th agreements were executed, 30
days remained in the 90-day good faith negotiation period
provided in the 1978 ABC contract. By virtue of the all-inclusive exclusivity provision contained in the CBS producer's
contract, Wolf was contractuaIly precluded from accepting any
ABC offer, no matter how attractive. Thus, by entering into
the producer's contract, Wolf had deprived ABC of its right
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ing the breach 19 , the court nevertheless ruled that ABC was not
entitled to equitable relief.
Citing the general rule that equity will not enforce specific
performance for personal services contracts, the opinion noted
that specific enforcement of ABC's right to match CBS's offer
under the first refusal clause and ultimate award of the contract
to ABC is "all the more impractical as a remedy in light of
Wolfs stated reluctance to continue working for ABC."20 Unconvinced that ABC did not have an adequate remedy at law for
any damages suffered because of the breach,21 the court also rejected the request for injunctive relief, despite the fact that precedent existed for granting such relief if the personal serVIces
are unique. 22
The opinion took pains to point out that the restrictive covenant not to negotiate "was an integral part of the first refusal
provision and is limited to a term of three months following expiration of the contract... Thus, even were restraint appropriate,
under the 1978 contract to his good faith negotiations for the
extension of that contract.
76 A.D.2d at 169-70, 430 N.Y.S. at 282.
19. The court stated:
This record makes apparent that the producer's agreement
was, in fact, one-half of a contrived bifurcation of the sportscaster's agreement, already orally reached on February 1st,
and that its all-inclusive exclusivity provision was the mechanism utilized by CBS to obtain, prior to the expiration of
ABC's right of first refusal and in avoidance of it, Wolrs commitment to become the CBS sportscaster on June 4, 1980.
Thus, CBS accomplished its goal of securing WoIrs sportscasting services on February 4th without the necessity of having
Wolf actually sign a sportscaster's agreement until ABC's
right of first refusal had expired. By so arranging the February
4, 1980 agreements, with knowledge of ABC's right of first refusal, CBS induced Wolrs breach of his 1978 contract with
ABC. (citations omitted).
76 A.D.2d at 169, 430 N.Y.S.2d at 281.
20. [d. at 171, 430 N.Y.S.2d at 283.
21. The court stated that "no cogent reason is shown to break with precedent and to
order an unwilling party to perform services of a personal nature, especially since we
remain un convinced that ABC does not have an adequate remedy at law for any damages suffered as a result of Wolrs breach." [d. at 172, 430 N.Y.S. at 284.
22. See King Records, Inc. v. Brown, 21 A.D.2d 593, 252 N.Y.S.2d 988 (1964); Harry
Rogers Theatrical Enters., Inc. v. Comstock, 225 A.D. 34, 232 N.Y.S. 1 (1928); Shubert
Theatrical Co. v. Gallagher, 206 A.D. 514, 201 N.Y.S. 577 (1923); Long Island Am. Ass'n.
Football Club v. Manrodt, 23 N.Y.S.2d 858 (1940).
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three months, and not the term of the CBS contract, would be
the measure of the length of any restriction against Wolf working for a competitor."23 It further narrowed the importance of
the clause by holding that "the first refusal clause was not a restrictive covenant in the true sense. Rather, it was a three month
moratorium on Wolfs employment as a sportscaster ... and obviously intended as a bargaining tool by which to force Wolf into
extending his contract with ABC."24
The court also denied ABC's motion to remit claims for
damages to the lower court for a hearing, since ABC failed to
submit any proof on the issue. 211
The dissenting opinion 26 argued that ABC should have been
granted equitable relief. Since a clause in the agreement with
CBS stated that Wolfs services were unique, the opinion concluded that CBS could not seriously contest that Wolfs services
were unique and ABC's monetary damages were difficult to
prove. Addressing the issue of the scope of the negative covenant
prohibiting Wolf from working for other television stations, the
dissent held that the covenant "must be read into that contract
if ABC's rights thereunder are to be effectively protected."27
Ruling that the fact that Wolf accepted an offer prior to the expiration of the contract effectively negated ABC's right to match
the offer CBS made to Wolf, the dissent concluded that Wolf
breached the contract and should be enjoined from competing
against ABC for the two year period of the contractual offer. 28
The case was appealed to the Court of Appeals,29 which affirmed the Appellate Division's ruling in a even more sympathetic light. Although it agreed that Wolf breached his obliga23. 76 A.D.2d at 171, 430 N.Y.S.2d at 285.
24. [d.

25. Since "the action was commenced before Wolf had ever performed a single sportscast for WCBS, and even before the expiration of the three-month first-refusal period,
during which ABC would have been without his service had he elected to remain 'on the
breach: " the opinion stated that it "seems fairly obvious that no thought was given to
damages." [d.
26. [d. at 172, 430 N.Y.S.2d at 286 (Murphy. J., dissenting).
27. Paragraph 6. (a) stated: "Artist acknowledges that his services and the rights and
privileges granted to CBS hereunder are unique; and CBS shall be entitled to injunctive
and other equitable relief to prevent any breach of this Agreement by Artist." [d.
28. [d.

29. 52 N.Y.2d 394, 420 N.E.2d 363, 438 N.Y.S.2d 482 (1981).
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tion to negotiate in good faith with ABC from December, 1979
through March, 1980, the opinion stated that "there was no basis in the record for the Appellate Division's conclusion that
Wolf violated the first refusal provision by entering into an oral
contract with CBS on February 4th," since the breach occurred
during the actual contract period 30 and therefore his conduct
"only violated the good-faith negotiation clause of the contract"
[emphasis added].
After reiterating the prohibition against specific performance as a remedy for breaches of personal service contracts, the
Court of Appeals discussed the claim for injunctive relief in
some detail. Despite precedent permitting injunctive relief
where "an employee either expressly or by clear implication
agreed not to work elsewhere for the period of his contract,"31
the court distinguished this case because the contract period already terminated, stating that public policy favors "robust and
uninhibited competition."32 It added that "once the employment
contract has terminated, equitable relief is potentially available
only to prevent injury from unfair competition or similar tortious behavior... In the absence of such circumstances, the gen30. Jd. at 397, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 484-85. In explaining its conclusion, the Court of
Appeals stated:
The first-refusal provision required Wolf, for a period of 90
days after termination of the ABC agreement, either to refrain
from accepting an offer of employment or to first submit the
offer to ABC for its consideration. By its own terms, the right
of first refusal did not apply to offers accepted by Wolf prior
to the March 5 termination of the ABC employment contract.
It is apparent, therefore, that Wolf could not have breached
the right of first refusal by accepting an offer during the term
of his employment with ABC.
[d. at 400-01, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 485.
31. Jd. at 398, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 486.
32. The court explained its rationale by stating:
Underlying the strict approach to enforcement of [anticompetitive) covenants is the notion that, once the term of an employment agreement has expired, the general public policy
favoring robust and uninhibited competition should not give
way merely because a particular employer wishes to insulate
himself from competition (citations omitted) ... Important,
too, are the "powerful considerations of public policy which
militate against sanctioning the loss of a man's livelihood" (citations omitted).
52 N.Y.2d at 399, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 487.
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eral policy of unfettered competition should prevail."33
In near-apocalyptic terms, the court stated that if equitable
relief were granted for "a simple, albeit serious, breach of a general contract negotiation clause," it would serve as the basis "for
an open-ended restraint upon the employee's ability to earn a
living should he ultimately choose not extend his
employment. "34
The dissenting opinion311 focused on the importance of the
first refusal provision, interpreting it as an express conditional
covenant under which Wolf could be restricted from appearing
on the air other than for ABC for the 90-day post-termination
period. 36 Due to Wolfs breach, the opinion added, ABC was effectively denied the opportunity to exercise its rights.
In rejecting the majority conclusion - that Wolf could not
have breached the first refusal clause when he accepted the
agreement with WCBS since the acceptance occurred during the
term of the contract - the dissent called that approach "a classical exaltation of form over substance [which] is hardly countenanced by equity."37 Applying the first refusal clause backwards
to the period of the ABC contract, the dissent concluded that a
modification of the Appellate Division's order to include a 90day injunction would be warranted. 38
The failure of both the Appellate Division and the Court of
Appeals to grant any equitable remedy against Wolfs breach of
contract effectively left ABC without any remedy and gave a license for Wolf and other popular broadcasters to violate their
obligations. Although ABC probably made a tactical mistake in
not claiming damages, it is unlikely that traditional contract
damage formulas would have made ABC "whole," since any
damages, such as lost ratings, shown at the time ABC brought
the action would be speculative.
33.Id.
34.Id.
35. Id. at 400, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 488 (Fuchs berg, J.,dissenting).
36.Id.
37. Id. at 401, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 489.
38.Id.
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II. WILHELMINA MODELS v. IMAN ABDULMAJID
The case of Wilhelmina Models v. Abdulmajid 39 involves an
even more flagrant breach by the employee. Iman Abdulmajid40
is a well-known fashion model who has frequently graced the
covers of many magazines. In 1975, she was "discovered" in her
native Kenya by a professional photographer who sent pictures
of Iman to plaintiff Wilhelmina Cooper, the president of the
plaintiff modeling company. Iman, at Wilhelmina's urging, came
to New York and signed a personal services contract on October
27, 1975 designating Wilhelmina as the sole and exclusive personal and business manager for Iman for a period of three years.
The contract had a clause acknowledging that Iman's services
were "extraordinary and unique and there was no adequate remedy at law for a breach of this agreement" and equitable remedies would be proper in a breach or attempted breach,41
Iman became a successful model, with earnings increasing
threefold from 1976-1978. 42 With ten months left in her contract, Iman informed Wilhelmina that she was leaving the
agency to go to Elite, a rival firm. Shortly thereafter, Iman appeared in the listing of models represented by Elite,
Wilhelmina brought an action seeking to enjoin Iman from
working for Elite or any other agency. The lower court granted
the requested relief, relying heavily on an earlier decision, King
Records, Inc. v. Brown,43 in which a musical performer was enjoined from recording for anyone other than the plaintiff, in part
because he had signed a "uniqueness" clause similar to the one
in Iman's agreement."
However, the Appellate Division unanimously reversed in a
39. 67 A.D.2d 853, 413 N.Y.S.2d 21 (1st Dept. 1979).
40. Known professionally as and hereinafter referred to as "Iman."
41. See Rudell, The Case of [man and a Mode/'s Agency, New York Law Journal,
June 18, 1979, at 1, col. 1.
42. She earned $32,000 in 1976, $72,000 in 1977 and over $100,000 in 1978.
43.21 A.D.2d 593, 252 N.Y.S.2d 988 (18t Dept. 1964). This opinion will be discussed
in greater detail in section III, infra.
44. "The 1960 contract expressly provides Brown's services are unique and extraordinary. The nature and extent of the recordings made by Brown under plaintiff's
contract and the large quantity thereof publicly sold substantiate the contract characterization of Brown's services as unique and extraordinary." [d. at 595, 252 N.Y.S.2d at 990.
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memorandum decision, concluding that the plaintiff had not
shown irreparable injury, and strongly questioning whether
Iman's services were unique. Stating that "the uniqueness of
[Iman's] services would seem to be somewhat diluted by the fact
that [Wilhelmina] required all models it manages to sign contracts with such recitations,"·!! the opinion concluded by noting
that:
Insofar as defendant model's services are 'unique'
in the sense that she looks like herself and not
somebody else and is very popular, that uniqueness is not vis-a-vis the plaintiff but vis-a-vis the
photographers and commercial organizations who
hire the model. Vis-a-vis [Wilhelmina], [Iman] is
simply one of a number of models whom plaintiff
manages, some of whom are in the same price
category. . . .46

Distinguishing the case from King Records, Inc. u. Brown, the
appellate division stated that Iman did not render services nor
receive payment from Wilhelmina, but rather paid Wilhelmina
as her agent. 47 The court concluded irreparable harm could not
be shown and that damages would appear to be an adequate
remedy.
The court in Wilhelmina sidestepped the question of
whether the model's services were unique by stating that the
uniqueness clause was in every contract made by the agency and
that any notoriety and uniqueness was in large part due to the
efforts of the photographers rather than the intrinsic beauty of
the model. The decision also didn't address the circumstances
that caused the apparently willful breach and the speculative
nature of any damages. The court's lack of notice of Iman's talents - calling her one a number of models managed by Wilhelmina - would have made proving damages very difficult.
In failing to grant equitable relief, Wolf and Wilhelmina
serve to undermine the rights of aggrieved employers and managers of entertainers and serve as a substantial attack on the
sanctity of contracts. With little likelihood of equitable relief
45. 67 A.D.2d at 853-54, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 23.
46. [d.
47. [d.
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and the difficulty of proving damages, a license to breach such
personal service contracts has been made.
III. RECENT DECISIONS
Since the aforementioned cases have been decided, more recent opinions have tended to apply Wolf and Wilhelmina to
general business contract problems, rather than in the entertainment sphere. 48 The only recent New York decision that tangentially deals with the unique type of employee like Wolf and Wilhelmina is Victor Temporary Services v. Slattery,49 a ruling
that sidestepped the issue as to whether a high ranking employee of a "temporary employment agency" was unique and
extraordinary.
The defendant-employee in Slattery was the branch manager of the agency's Rochester office for nine years. While so employed, the defendant had signed an agreement which prevented
her from competing with her employer for a period of one year
after she left her employment with the plaintiff. Four months
after she ended her employment with the plaintiff employment
agency, the defendant opened her own temporary employment
48. See, e.g. Quandt's Wholesale Distribs. v. Giardino, 87 A.D.2d 684, 448 N.Y.S.2d
809 (3d Dept. 1982), aft'd. 56 N.Y.2d 85, 452 N.Y.S.2d 329 (1982) (food salesman's restrictive covenant not to compete for a period of six months after termination in sales
area held invalid since there was no evidence that employee's services were unique and
extraordinary and no evidence that employee had access to trade secrets); McKay v.
Communispond, Inc., 581 F. Supp. 801 (S.D. N.Y. 1983) (former employee's three-year
restrictive covenant not to pursue his career as an instructor in the business communications field held invalid, due to New York's antipathy towards such anticompetitive
clauses; the decision also noted that the employee never signed any employment contract); Scott Paper Co. v. Finnegan, 101 A.D.2d 787, 476 N.Y.S.2d 316 (1st Dept. 1984)
(former employer failed to demonstrate that employee-manager in paper company was
unique or extraordinary or privy to trade secrets and injunction preventing him from
assuming comparable position with rival firm was improper); Alexander & Alexander
Services v. Maloff, 105 A.D.2d 1066, 482 N.Y.S.2d 386 (4th Dept. 1984) ("[A) covenant
not to compete must meet not only the foregoing criteria, but will be specifically enforceable only to the extent that it is necessary to protect the employer's legitimate interests,
is not harmful to the general public, and is not unreasonably burdensome to the employee" (citation omitted).); Kraft Agency, Inc. v. Delmonico, 110 A.D.2d 177, 494
N.Y.S.2d 77 (4th Dept. 1985) (part of covenant not to compete against insurance agency
within 50 miles for five-year period after sale of company held invalid as too broad);
Wolff v. Wolff, 67 N.Y.2d 638, 490 N.E.2d 532, 499 N.Y.S.2d 665 (1986) (lower court
abused its discretion in enjoining, with no limitation in time or geography, a shareholder
in a close corporation from engaging in legitimate competition with that corporation).
49. 105 A.D.2d 1115, 482 N.Y.S.2d 623 (4th Dept. 1984).
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agency three blocks from the plaintiff and solicited business
from those she previously dealt with while working for plaintiff. IIO After failing to comply with the plaintiff's notices to stop
her activity, the plaintiff commenced an action for injunction
relief.
Citing Wolf, the Appellate Division ruled in a memorandum
opinion that such covenants are disfavored by the court and
modified a lower court ruling granting the relief. The appellate
court ruled that questions of fact existed as to whether the employee was in fact "unique and extraordinary" and whether she
had access to trade secrets. III
A recent California decision, Motown Record Corp. v.
Brockert,1I2 involved a fact situation not unlike that in Wilhelmina, but the bulk of the opinion dealt with the interpretation
and legislative history of a state statute that limits injunctive
relief. The case involved the singer Tina Marie Brockert,1I3 who
signed exclusive personal services contracts with the plaintiff
record company and music publisher. Each contract had a duration of one year, but granted the companies six options to renew
for one year periods. During the contract period, "Teena Marie"
became a very popular singer, achieving "Gold Record" status. 1I4
During the last option, Teena Marie informed the plaintiffs
that she would no longer perform under the contracts and gave a
written notice of rescission. Upon learning of her intention to
perform for another company, the plaintiffs sought a preliminary injunction to prevent Teena Marie from performing such
services until the expiration of her contract in 1983. 1111
California statutory law provides that a personal services
contracts must pay a minimum compensation of $6,000 per year
before a court can even consider imposing injunctive relief for a
50. [d. at 1116, 482 N.Y.S.2d at 624.
51. [d.

52. 160 Cal. App. 3d 123, 207 Cal. Rptr. 574 (1984).
53. Professionally known as "Teena Marie."
54. She attained that position after her fourth and last album for Motown, "It Must
Be Magic." The album sold over 400,000 copies.
55. 160 Cal. App. 3d at 128, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 577.
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breach.1i6 Each of the options agreed to by Teena Marie and the
record company would pay the singer a minimum of $6,000 if
exercised. The lower court, citing § 3423 of the California Civil
Code, granted the requested relief.
The appellate court ruled otherwise. In a unanimous opinion, the court ruled that based on legislative history and statutory interpretation, § 3423 only applied to contracts which guarantee the performance of a minimum of $6,000 per year, and not
to an option of $6,000, which was merely "a potential" compensation, rather than a guaranteed compensation.1i7 The decision
also noted that applying the statutory provision to an option
clause would defeat the legislative intent to "limit injunctive relief to contracts where not only the services are special or unique
but the performer herself is a person of distinction in her field at
the time of entering the contract. "1i8
The court concluded by noting that the record company did
not make a contract with a "star," but with a "virtual unknown." Due to that qualitative distinction, the court determined that damages would be the appropriate remedy.1i9
Due to the courts' increasing reluctance to grant injunctions, some new or expanded traditional remedies may be necessary to rectify this problem. Some of these expanded remedies
are: a greater use of restrictions on specific performance, the expanded use of injunctions, or the more liberal use of special or
punitive damages.
56. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 3423, which states:
An injunction cannot be granted: ... [tlo prevent the breach
of a contract, other than a contract in writing for the rendition
or furnishing of personal services from one to another where
the minimum compensation for such services is at the rate of
not less than $6,000 per annum and where the promised services is of a special, unique, unusual extraordinary or intellectual character, which gives it peculiar value, the loss of which
cannot be reasonably or adequately compensated in damages
in an action at law, the performance of which would not be
specifically enforced. . . .
57. 160 Cal. App. 3d at 135, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 582.
58. [d. at 136, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 582.
59. [d. at 138, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 584.
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IV. PROPOSED REMEDIES
A. EXPANSION OF SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE
Specific performance, the forced performance of a contractual obligation,60 is granted by a court of equity when damages
awards are impractical or inadequate. 6} Specific performance is
clearly an exceptional remedy.62 Although courts have displayed
willingness to grant specific performance in contracts involving
the sale of land,63 sale of antiques,6. patent rights,611 and longterm output and requirements contracts,66 they are clearly unwilling to impose this remedy for personal services contracts on
the ground that specific performance would create an objectionable form of slavery or personal servitude. 67
An element of uniqueness must be present in every contract
involved in a specific performance case. Yet, in Wolf and
60. J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO. THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 16-2 (2d ed. 1977).
61. [d. at § 16-1.

62. 11 S. WILLISTON. WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 1338 (3d ed. 1968); 5 A. CORBIN.
CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 993 (1964).
63. Real property contracts, covenants running with the land and options to
purchase land have traditionally been enforced by grants of specific performance. See
Mobil Oil Corp. v. Brennan, 385 F.2d 951 (5th Cir. 1967) (covenant running with the
land); Abdallah v. Abdallah, 359 F.2d 170 (3rd Cir. 1966) (option to purchase real property); McCullough v. Newton, 348 S.W.2d 138 (Mo. 1961) (sale of land). See also
Kronman, Specific Performance, 45 U. CHI L. REV. 351 (1978).
64. Such contracts are specifically enforceable on the ground that the item has attained a sentimental significance or value over and above its monetary value. See Pusey
v. Pusey, 23 Eng. Rep. 465 (1684) (transfer of an ancient horn); Burr v. Bloomsburg, 101
N.J. Eq. 615, 33 A. 962 (1927) (sale of a diamond ring); Falcke v. Gray, 62 Eng. Rep. 250
(1859) (sale of two china jars). See Kronman, supra note 63, at 356, n.21.
65. Patent & Licensing Corp. v. Olsen, 188 F.2d 522 (2d Cir. 1951) (employee ordered to assign patents on process developed while in the course of employment to
employer).
66. See Laclede Gas Co. v. Amoco Oil Co., 522 F.2d 33 (8th Cir. 1975) (supply of gas
to residential subdivisions); Campbell Soup Co. v. Wentz, 172 F.2d 80 (3rd Cir. 1948)
(sale of carrots); Eastern Rolling Mill Co. v. Michlovitz, 157 Md. 51, 145 A. 378 (1929)
(scrap iron). See also Kronman, supra note 63, at 356, n.25.
67. The policy that equity will not award specific performance for contracts for personal services is said to be based on the difficulty of gauging proper performance, the
American commitment to personal liberty, and the undesirability of forcing cooperation
between the parties if confidence and loyalty have already been destroyed. See 5A A.
CORBIN. CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1204 at 400-01 (1964). The Thirteenth Amendment to
the U.S. Constitution states: "Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude ... shall exist
within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction." See also Sanquirino
v. Benedetti, 1 Barb. 315 (Sup. Ct. 1st Dept. 1847); De Rivafinoli v. Corsetti, 4 Paige Ch.
264 (N.Y. Ch. 1833).
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Wilhelmina, the respective courts were reluctant to call the defendants "unique" to warrant specific performance and to acknowledge that money damages would not be adequate.
Some legal scholars have advocated the more liberal use of
specific performance on the ground that it would be more efficient economically than damage awards. 68 Professor Linzer had
advocated the adoption of a two-step test for determining
whether specific performance should be decreed. First, a comparison of the efficiency of money damages with that of specific
performance. If money damages is less efficacious than specific
performance, the second tier would be applied, that is, whether
specific performance would cause unusual hardships by enslavement or by costs for society.69
This test could possibly lead to the use of specific performance as a remedy for breaches of personal service contracts in at
least a few, if not all situations. Looking at Wolf and Wilhelmina, the loss of Wolf by ABC and Iman by Wilhelmina produced damages that would be difficult to determine or speculative under today's standards, such as lost ratings and lost
bookings. Thus, the first leg of Professor Linzer's test would be
met. As to the second tier, it may be possible that the society's
interest in the sanctity of contract may outweigh the hardships
caused by the employees who must perform.
Still, it would be difficult and impractical even under this
proposed standard to award specific performance against Wolf
and Iman. Wolf claimed that he was dissatisfied with executives
at ABC and refused to work there even after ABC accepted his
salary demands. However, in Wilhelmina such relief may be
somewhat more likely, since there was no evidence that Iman
disliked her manager, but rather went to a rival for a more lucrative contract. This Linzer formula could apply to other entertainers who may decide to breach their obligations for more
money, and not because they felt ill will towards their
68. See Kronman, supra note 63; Linzer, On the Amorality of Contract Remedies Efficiency, Equity and the Second Restatement, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 111 (1981).
69. Linzer, supra note 68, at 131. Also, another reason why the courts are reluctant
to impose specific performance to personal services and even most non-personal services
contracts is the difficulty of supervision. See J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note 60, at
§ 16-10.
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employers. The moral justification to keep and adhere to
promises made also forms an important consideration for the expansion of the remedy of specific performance. 7o If, as in Wolf
and Wilhelmina, individuals can breach contracts with little or
no punishment, what incentive is there for others in our society
to honor contractual obligations? In fact, the altering or renegotiating of contracts has become more prevalent in the last two
decades. 71
Although it is admittedly unlikely that specific performance
will become more suitable for personal services contracts, the arguments of professor Linzer could apply:
. The general use of specific performance could
produce truer economic efficiency than the present system, that counts the money cost of performance to the promisor and not the emotional
and other costs of nonperformance to the promisee. Money damages lend themselves to the selection valuation so often based by economists,
discounting things that are important to some
people but that do not easily translate into
money. By holding the parties to their bargain,
but permitting them to negotiate out, specific performance lets no outsiders substitute their values
for those of the parties. 72
With the prevailing attitudes in favor of individual rights73
70. See Schwartz, The Case for Specific Performance, 89 YALE L.J. 271, 278 n.26
(1979)(citing J. MACKIE, ETHICS 110-11, 116-18, 184-85 (1977)).
71. This has been especially true in the area of sports. See N.Y. Times, Jan. 20,
1984, § 1, at 18, col. 5 (football player renegotiates contract with team after buying himself out of option held by New Jersey Generals football team of the United States Football League); N.Y. Times, Feb. 10, 1985, § 1, at 42, col. 5 (baseball player wins ruling in
breach of contract action against the Kansas City Royals. Blue to receive between $1
million and $1.5 million); N.Y. Times, Mar. 10, 1985, § 5, at 1, col. 3 (Yankees fail to
appease player Don Mattingly with two-year $1 million contract. Old contract renewed
at $320,000 as Mattingly reacts bitterly).
72. Linzer, supra note 68, at 138.
73. U.S. CONST. amends. XIII and XIV. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which states that:
Every person, who, under color of any statute, regulation, ordinance, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, or the
District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be lia-
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and the generally limited use of specific performance, it does not
seem likely that the doctrine of specific performance will be expanded to be an effective remedy for entertainers' breach of personal service contracts. Also, due to the higher costs in terms of
time and commitment, such a remedy would not be the best way
to prevent wholesale breaches of such agreements.
B.

INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

Due to the traditional dislike of the use of specific performance for personal services contracts, the courts came up with the
concept of a "negative injunction" to take effect during the contract period, preventing the breaching party from performing
the same contractual duties for anyone other the plaintiff for the
remainder of the contract period. 74 The negative injunction has
traditionally been an effective remedy to prevent employees who
have had access to trade secrets,n customer lists,76 and those
who are "unique"77 from breaching their contracts.
Injunctive relief against breaches by unique entertainers
was first granted in the 19th Century English case of Lumley u.
Wagner. 78 Lumley involved a fact situation not unlike that in
Wilhelmina. Johanna Wagner, a famous opera singer,79 contracted to perform a specified number of times in a theater that
the plaintiff had rented. The contract contained a promise not
to perform for anyone else during the contract period, but the
smger broke the promise and made a contract to perform for
ble to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity or
other proceeding for redress.
74. J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note 60, at § 16-19; J. WEISHART & C. LOWELL,
THE LAW OF SPORTS § 4.03 (1979).
75. J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note 60, at § 16-19.
76. [d. See also Quandt's Wholesale Distribs. v. Giardino, 87 A.D.2d 684, 448
N.Y.S.2d 809 (3d Dept. 1982), aff'd, 56 N.Y.2d 85, 452 N.Y.S.2d 329 (1982); Mixing
Equip. Co. v. Philadelphia Gear, Inc., 436 F.2d 1308 (3d Cir. 1971); Town & Country
House & Home Servo V. Newbery, 3 N.Y.2d 554, 147 N.E.2d 724, 170 N.Y.S.2d 328
(1958).
77. Victor Temporary Servs. V. Slattery, 105 A.D.2d 1115, 482 N.Y.S.2d 623 (4th
Dept. 1984); McKay v. Communis pond, Inc., 581 F. Supp. 801 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); Purchas·
ing Assocs., Inc. V. Weitz, 13 N.Y.2d 267, 196 N.E.2d 245, 246 N.Y.S.2d 600 (1963).
78. 42 Eng. Rep. 687 (Ch. 1852).
79. Johanna Wagner was the niece of the composer Richard Wagner and "was not an
unknown member of a chorus line. She was one of Europe's best· known opera singers,"
called "the cantatrice of the Court of His Majesty the King of Prussia." See Motown
Record Corp. v. Brockert, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 583.
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another theater manager. The English court granted the 'requested injunctive relief.
The Lumley rationale was accepted by American courts resulting in the enjoining of newspaper columnists, athletes, actors, singers and other performers from working for new employers.80 In order for an injunction to be issued against a former
employee, the plaintiff must establish that: (1) such relief is necessary to avoid irreparable injury; (2) that no adequate remedy
of law (damages) exists; and (3) a likelihood of success on the
merits. 8 } The mere existence of competition by a former employee will not, in itself, support the issuance of an injunction. 82
New York's most important rationale of Lumley comes in
the case of King Records Inc. v. Brown. 83 King Records, cited
and distinguished in Wolf,8. involved James Brown, a vocalist,
musician and orchestra leader who breached an exclusive recording and distribution agreement with plaintiff's record company
when Brown signed a similar agreement with a record company
80. See Harry Rogers Theatrical Enters. v. Comstock, 225 A.D. 34, 232 N.Y.S. 1
(1928); Shubert Theatrical Co. v. Gallagher, 206 A.D. 514, 201 N.Y.S. 577 (1923); Long
Island Am. Assoc'n. Football Club, Inc. v. Manrodt, 23 N.Y.S.2d 858 (Sup. Queens,
1940); Harry Hastings Attractions v. Howard, 119 Misc. 326, 196 N.Y.S. 228 (1922); Associated Newspapers v. Phillips, 294 F. 845 (2d Cir. 1923); Philadelphia Ball Club v.
Lajoie, 202 Pa. 210, 51 A. 973 (1902); Skyland Broadcasting Corp. v. Hamby, 141 N.E.2d
783 (Ct. Comm. Pleas, Ohio, 1957); Clooney v. WCPO TV Div. of Scripps-Howard B.C.,
35 Ohio App. 2d 124, 300 N.E.2d 256 (1973); Cullman Broadcasting Co. v. Bosley, 373
So.2d 830 (Ala. 1979); Evening News Ass'n. v. Peterson, 477 F. Supp. 77 (D. D.C. 1979).
81. 43 C.J.S. Injunctions § 17 et. seq. See also Beacon Theatres v. Westover, 359
U.S. 500 (1959); Quandt's Wholesale Distribs. Inc. v. Giardino, 87 A.D.2d 684, 444
N.Y.S.2d 809 (3d Dept. 1982); Chicago Research and Trading v. New York Futures Exch.
84 A.D.2d 413, 446 N.Y.S.2d 280 (1st Dept. 1982). Some courts have adopted a somewhat
more flexible standard to determine if injunctive relief is warranted. See Wainwright
Sec. v. Wall Street Transcript Corp., 558 F.2d 91 (2d Cir. 1971) (a plaintiff must establish: "irreparable injury, combined with either a probability of success on the merits, or a
fair ground for litigation and a balance of the hardships in his favor.").
82. Although many restrictive covenants contain clauses stating that the former employee admits that a breach of contract will produce "irreparable harm," no case has
been found in which a court held such harm existed solely on such a clause. See Liddle &
Gray, Proof of Damages for Breach of a Restrictive Covenant or Noncompetition Agreement, 9 EMP. REL. L.J. 455, 471 n.2 (1983).
83. 21 A.D.2d 593, 252 N.Y.S.2d 988 (1st Dept. 1964).
84. On June 23, 1960, plaintiff and Brown entered into a written agreement whereby
his "exclusive personal services in connection with the production of phonograph
records" were engaged by King Records for the period of five years commencing July I,
1960. Brown covenanted during the contract period not to make recordings for any other
person. 252 N.Y.S.2d at 990.
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organized by him and his manager about eighteen months before
the expiration of the first contract. After concluding that the
corporate defendants had knowledge of the earlier contract, the
court granted an injunction restraining Brown from recording
and restraining the other defendants from manufacturing, distributing or selling any recordings of Brown. 8Ci
In comparing the rationale of the court in King Records to
that in Wolf and Wilhelmina, it is apparent how times have
changed. In King Records, the court stated that "the nature and
extent of the recordings made by Brown substantiate the characterization of Brown's services as unique and extraordinary."86 It
added that the fact that the defendant (Mercury Records) paid
$27,000 to Brown's company to distribute the records "confirmed Mercury's appraisal of Brown's services as unique and
extraordinary."87 In Wolf and Wilhelmina, the contracts also
had clauses classifying the parties' services as unique and extraordinary. Also, the facts clearly showed that competitors were
willing to pay top dollar to those individuals in the hope of convincing Wolf and Wilhelmina to sign new agreements. Yet, the
respective courts gave little time or effort to ABC's claims that
Wolfs services were unique and the court in Wilhelmina concluded that her services were not unique at all.
Another analogous case, Long Island American Association
Football Club v. Manrodt,88 also demonstrates the differing approach as to what constitutes unique services. In Manrodt, the
plaintiff football club sought an injunction to restrain the defendants from playing for any other club. The defendants signed
a contract to play with the plaintiff, but shortly afterward signed
to play with a team in a rival league. In holding that the services
were indeed unique, the court stated:
Once a team is organized and the football season
begins, it may be extremely difficult to find adequate replacements for players about whom plays
have been planned . . . by reason of the fact that
85.
86.
87.
88.

[d. at 992.
[d. at 990.
[d.
23 N.Y.S.2d 858 (Sup. Queens, 1940).
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after the start of the season, most of the desirable
players have already been hired by other clubs. 89

Although the players in question did not claim to be "stars"
or team leaders, the court ruled that their selection to the team
in itself made their service unique. In Wilhelmina, the court
stated that despite the fact that she was chosen by a prestigious
model agency, she was still "one of a number of models whom
plaintiff managed, some of whom are in the same price category
as the defendant."9o
California courts have also been very reluctant to impose injunctive relief, despite the fact that injunctions on personal services contracts are governed by statute. 91 This has held true
even in cases involving such well-known entertainers as Redd
FOXX. 92 The only major exception to this trend is MeA Records
v. Newton-John,93 where the popular singer Olivia Newton-John
made an agreement where she was obligated to produce for the
record company two albums a year with an option for additional
albums in return for the payment of substantial royalties. 9 • Relying on the California Civil Code's injunction provision, the
court upheld the injunction since Ms. Newton-John was an established star with "unique and extraordinary" talents and had
guaranteed compensation over $6,000 no matter if the record
succeeded in the marketplace or not. 91i
89. [d. at 860.

90. 67 A.D. 2d at 854, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 22-23.
91. See KGB v. Giannaoulas, 104 Cal. App. 3d 844; 164 Cal. Rptr. 571 (1980). A
radio station sued an ex-employee/mascot for breach of an employment contract, unfair
competition and injunctive relief to stop a former employee from appearing in a chicken
suit, the costume he had worn while appearing as the station's mascot. The defendant,
popularly known as the "KGB Chicken," made post-employment appearances in a modified chicken costume. The court denied injunctive relief, claiming that such a restraint
would impair the defendant's right to be engaged in gainful employment and would be
fundamentally unfair.
92. See Foxx v. Williams, 244 Cal. App. 2d 223, 52 Cal. Rptr. 896 (1966). Comedian
Redd Foxx brought an action for an accounting against a recording company which was
distributing his albums. The company sought an injunction to prevent Foxx from
breaching the exclusivity clause of his contracts. The lower court granted the injunctive
relief, but the appellate court reversed, ruling that since Foxx was not guaranteed at
least $6,000, injunctive relief is barred under California Civil Code § 3423.
93. 90 Cal. App. 3d 18, 153 Cal. Rptr. 153 (1979).
94. MCA agreed to pay royalties and nonreturnable advance of $250,000 for each
album recorded in the initial two-year period and $100,000 for each album recorded in
the option years. [d. at 21.
95. 90 Cal. App. 3d at 22, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 157.
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The rationales of Wolf and Wilhelmina serve to make injunctive relief an even more limited, remedy than in the past.
Since these cases were decided it would seem that proving "uniqueness" would pose a greater burden for an employer or manager and would effectively leave them without a remedy if an
injunction would be denied.
V. NEW FORMS OF DAMAGES TIVE REMEDY

THE MOST EFFEC-

Damages, the most common form of relief for aggrieved parties, seeks to place that party in the same economic position he
would have had if the contract had been performed.96 That basic
premise derives from a philosophy, first espoused in the seminal
case of Hadley u. Baxendale 97 that a promisor is only liable for
damages which "arise naturally" from a breach or that were in
the contemplation of the parties at the time they made the contract.98 The first prong is known as "general" damages and the
second as "special" damages.
The rule in Hadley focuses on the certainty or definiteness
of damages, a concept that must be expanded in cases of the
breach of high-powered personal services contracts. To prove
certainty, a "higher caliber" of evidence must be required than
is needed in other factual issues. 99 The most practical kind of
damages, lost profits, usually cannot be proven under this standard. Therefore, it has usually been held that lost profits caused
by a breach of an entertainment contract are too speculative. loo
With "star" entertainers, a relaxation of this rule would be
most beneficial. An employer or manager may prefer to obtain
such damages rather than an injunction, since, under injunctive
96. J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note 60, at § 14-4. See also D.C.C. § 1-106; 5 A.
CORBIN, supra note 62, at § 992; 11 S. WILLISTON, supra note 62, at § 1338.
97. 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854).
98. Id. at 151. The rationale for this standard is to control large damage verdicts by
juries, keeping the jury from placing too high a value on the promisee's "subjective" loss.
See Yorio, In Defense of Money Damages for Breach of Contract, 82 COLUM. L. REV.
1365, 1391-92 n.134 (1982)(citing G. GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 126 n.122
(1974».
99. J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note 60, at § 14-8.
100. See Narragansett Amusement Co. v. Riverside Park Amusement Co., 260 Mass.
265, 157 N.E. 532 (1927); Bernstein v. Meech, 130 N.Y. 354, 29 N.E. 255 (1891).
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relief, no compensation is received for the loss and the organization loses the services of the entertainer. A calculation of "lost
ratings" or "lost bookings" would be easy to ascertain and an
effective means of calculating damages.
Though rare, some courts have granted such relief in the
past. In Orbach u. Paramount Pictures Corp.,I°1 the court decided that a theater was able to recover on the basis of proof of
net profits prior and subsequent to the period of breach and of
the profits of another theater in the same city. Yet other courts,
on the same facts, ruled the other way.102 A relaxation of the
"certainty" rule by the adoption and expansion of Orbach would
bring "lost ratings" and "bookings" into the realm of lost profits.
A.

EXPANSION OF LOST PROFITS

In the last fifteen years, several cases in the sports law field
have discussed novel and intelligent ways to expand the notion
of lost profits. Lemat Corp. u. Barry,103 the San Francisco Warriors basketball team sought to recover lost ticket revenues as
damages for the loss of star player Rick Barry.104 A lower court
ruled that the team had been injured in the amount of $365,000,
the difference between the gross receipts and a projected
amount that would have been received had he participated. lOCI
Although the appellate court denied the request, since injunctive
relief was already granted, it did not specifically reject this
method of calculating damages. 106
101. 233 Mass. 281, 123 N.E. 669 (1919).
102. But cf. Broadway Photoplay Co. v. World Film Corp., 225 N.Y. 104, 121 N.E.
756 (1919) which held that similar proof of damages were held to be too uncertain. See J.
CALAMARI & J. PERILLO. supra note 60, at § 14-8.
103. 275 Cal. App. 2d 671, 80 Cal. Rptr. 240 (1969).
104. 275 Cal. App. 2d at 265, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 243. Barry was sitting out a season
after an injun~tion was granted to prevent him from going to another team. See also
Whitehill, Enforceability of Professional Sports Contracts - What's the Harm in it?,
35 Sw. L.J. 803 (1981).
105. Id. The amount of the projected receipts was calculated by multiplying the
immediately preceding year's gross receipts by the average percentage growth rate of
receipts for the entire National Basketball Association during the year in question, less
additional costs that would have been incurred had Barry played. The result was a
$365,000 decline in revenues. See Whitehill, supra note 104, at 814-15.
106. But the decision stated in dictum that damages were speculative and too uncertain. 275 Cal. App. 2d at 678, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 246.
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Other calculations of damages have also been argued,107
such as loss of playoff participation rewards. lOS The inability to
increase the price of tickets in the subsequent year has also been
as a basis for determination of damages. l09
A related concept is the question of whether "lost future
royalties" can be recovered when a publishing or licensing agreement is breached. Although such damages are generally regarded
as too speculative because "the whim and fancy of the public
determines sales upon which royalties are based,"llo the courts
have accepted the possibility that such awards can be granted!ll
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in
upholding a damage award, recognized that in some cases a
jury's damage estimate cannot be achieved with scientific precision, and concluded that only a reasonable approximation of
damages is necessary.112
A great receptiveness to lost profits would serve as an effective remedy to cases like Wolf and Wilhelmina. Evidence such
as a drop in ratings by WABC or a gain in ratings by WCBS-TV
after Wolf switched employers could be a standard of reference
107. See Tomjanovich v. California Sports, Inc., No. 78-243 (S.D. Texas, Oct. 10,
1979). The Houston Rockets sought to recover business losses from the player's absence
during one season and for losses incurred in the immediately succeeding year. The current year's loss was calculated by subtracting the average per game walk-up sales receipts for games in which Tomjanovich did not play from the average per game receipts
for games he did play and subtracting additional expense that would have been incurred
if the attendance had been at the higher level. The resulting figure was the loss in net
walk-up sales receipts. Whitehill claims that these calculations focused on the specific
negative impact on the club and "approaches actual damages more closely" than in
Lemat. Whitehill, supra note 104, at 816.
108. [d. at 817. The team in Tomjanovich calculated lost playoff revenues by first
determining that Tomjanovich's net scoring contribution was slightly more than five
points per game and 15 games in the current season were lost by five points or less after
the player's injury. If those games had been won, the Rockets would have qualified for
the first round of the playoffs.
109. Whitehill, supra note 104, at 817 n.131.
110. See Freund v. Washington Square Press, Inc., 34 N.Y.2d 379, 314 N.E.2d 419,
357 N.Y.S.2d 857 (1974).
111. In Contemporary Mission, Inc. v. Famous Music Corp., 557 F.2d 918 (2d Cir.
1977), the defendant, a producer and distributor of records withdrew a record by the
plaintiff after it had achieved a modest amount of success. The court upheld a jury determination awarding the plaintiff damages.
112. [d. See also House, Good Faith Rejection and Specific Performance in Publishing Contracts: Safeguarding the Author's Reasonable Expectations, 51 BROOKLYN L.
REV. 95 (1984).
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as could lost bookings by Wilhelmina and increased bookings by
Elite after Iman changed agencies. 113
B.

THE GRANTING OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES

Punitive damages are granted to punish malicious or willful
conduct. 1l4 Used primarily in the tort field, the purpose of punitive damages is to prevent the wrongdoer from similar conduct
in the future and to deter others from engaging in the same conduct. In the area of contract law, punitive damages are not
awarded except in cases where the breach is accompanied by an
independent tort, llIi and where the breach involves the malicious
or wanton violation of a fiduciary duty.1l8
The use of punitive damages in cases of egregious conduct
by a breaching party would be effective in deterring such willful
breaches as in both Wolf and Wilhelmina. Expansion of puni113. In fact, a strong case can be made for such damages. Wolfs departure from
WABC and arrival at WCBS may have resulted in a significant change in ratings between the two stations. In February 1980, before Wolfs departure, WABC's 6 p.m.
broadcast averaged a 12 rating and a 21 share (a rating signifies the percentage of all
people watching and a share signifies the percentage of people watching who are watching television at that moment) and its 11 p.m. broadcast averaged a 14 rating and a 27
share, leading all stations in both time slots. WCBS had a 9 rating and a 16 share at 6
p.m. and a 10 rating and a 20 share at 11 p.m. WNBC (a third station surveyed) had a 7
rating and a 13 share at 6 p.m. and a 9 rating and a 17 share at 11 p.m. By May, WABC
had a 9 rating and a 20 share at 6 p.m. and a 13 rating and a 25 share at 11 p.m., still
leading over WCBS, which had an 8 rating and an 18 share at 6 p.m. and a 10 rating and
a 25 share at 11 p.m., and WNBC with a 7 rating and a 15 share at 6 p.m. and a 10 rating
and a 20 share at 11 p.m. By July, one month after Wolf joined WCBS, WABC's lead
narrowed, with an 8 rating and a 19 share at 6 p.m. and a 10 rating and a 21 share at 11
p.m. over WCBS's 7 rating and 17 share at 6 p.m. and 10 rating and 20 share at 11 p.m.
WNBC had a 7 rating and 17 share at 6 p.m. and a 9 rating and a 19 share at 11 p.m. By
November 1980, almost six months after Wolf switched stations, the ratings showed
WCBS a decisive leader with an 11 rating and a 19 share at 6 p.m. and a 13 rating and a
25 share at 11 p.m. over WABC's 10 rating and 17 share at 6 p.m. and 9 rating and 18
share. WNBC had a 9 rating and a 16 share at 6 p.m. and a 12 rating and a 24 share at
11 p.m. WABC lost a significant portion of its audience to WCBS and, to some extent
WNBC during this period. Arbitron Ratings Service reports, 1980.
114. J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note 60, at § 14-3.
115. See 11 S. WILLISTON, supra note 62, at § 1340; Comment, Exemplary Damages
in Contract Cases, 7 WILLAMETTE L.J. 137 (1971); Klingbiel v. Commercial Credit Corp.,
439 F.2d 1303 (10th Cir. 1971) (breach of contract constitutes conversion); I.H.P. Corp.
v. 210 Central Park South Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 329, 189 N.E.2d 812, 239 N.Y.S.2d 547
(1963) (breach of lease constituted tort of forcible entry).
116. J. CALAMARI & J. PERILI.O, supra note 60, at § 14-3. See also Brown v. Coates,
253 F.2d 36 (D.C. Cir. 1958); International Bhd. of Boilermakers, etc. v. Brasswell' 388
F.2d 193 (5th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 935 (1968); Hoche Prods., S.A. v. Jayark
Films Corp., 256 F.Supp. 291 (S.D. N.Y. 1966).
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tive damages has been advocated117 and a three-pronged test has
been proposed to determine if punitive damages are recoverable.
A party must show that: (1) a valid contract was made; (2) there
is an implied duty arising from the contract but distinct from
the contractual obligations; and (3) the defendant committed a
malicious or willful breach of the implied duty.lI8
In employment agreements, some courts have recognized an
independent duty of good faith and fair dealing. ll9 Wolfs actions in negotiating an agreement behind ABC's back during an
exclusive period constituted at the very least, a violation of any
duty of good faith and honest bargaining, concepts that are integral to society's preservation of the sanctity of agreements. The
same could be said for Iman, who left Wilhelmina with ten
months left in her contract with the agency, though not enough
detail is known as to what precipitated her move to Elite.
An explicit recognition by New York courts of good faith
and fair dealing as implied duties would satisfy the second prong
of the three-prong test. All that the aggrieved employer would
have to show is whether the defendant committed a malicious or
willful breach of the duty.

C.

LIQUIDATED DAMAGES

Liquidated, or agreed, damages, is an attempt by the parties
to a contract to provided their own damage remedies in case of a
breach. Courts will uphold these damages when: (1) actual damages are difficult to calculate; and (2) where the amount stated is
reasonable. 120 Usually, liquidated damages will be used as dam117. See P. Coleman, Punitiue Damages for Breach of Contract: A New Approach,
11 STETSON L. REV. 251 (1982).
118. [d. at 260-261.
119. Fortune v. National Cash Register Co., 373 Mass. 96, 364 N.E.2d 1251 (1977)
involved the termination of an employment contract. The court held that bad faith termination was a breach of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. As the court
stated "parties in contracts and commercial transactions must act in good faith toward
one another. Good faith and fair dealing between parties are pervasive requirements in
our law; it can be said fairly, that parties to contracts or commercial transactions are
bound by this standard." 364 N.E.2d at 1256.
120. J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO. supra note 60, at § 14-31. See also RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 356(1), which states:
Damages for breach by either party may be liquidated in the
agreement but only at an amount that is reasonable in the
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ages in a breach of restrictive covenant,121 but may be applicable
in cases of breach of personal service contracts by well-known
entertainers.
As was earlier stated, actual damages in the traditional
sense are hard to calculate for both Wolf and Wilhelmina and a
liquidated damages clause pinpointing an amount of damages
for breach may be a simple and direct method for determining
damages. However, on a practical level, there is no guarantee
that high-powered individuals will accept such clauses in their
contracts and the amount of such damages may be more difficult
for the parties to negotiate than for the courts to impose.
Also, the intention of the parties is not dispositive if the
courts interpret such liquidated damage clauses as penalties,122
or if the amount stipulated is out of proportion to the probable
damage. 123 Due to the difficulties in getting entertainers to accept such a clause and the presumption that courts often use to
strike liquidated damage clauses as penalties, such a remedy
may be impractical and ineffective.
D.

TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE WITH CONTRACT

In recent years, New York and California courts have held
that a breach of contract can be actionable in tort, permitting
the injured party relief that would not be available in an action
founded in contract.124 New York courts have applied this concept narrowly, ruling that the interference with the contract
must be independently tortious or that the relationship disrupted was legally binding. m California has expanded the conlight of the anticipated or actual loss caused by the breach and
the difficulties of proof of loss. A term fixing unreasonably
large liquidated damages is unenforceable on grounds of public policy as a penalty.
See United States v. Bethlehem Steel Co., 205 U.S. 105 (1907) (upholding a liquidated
damages clause in a contract for the manufacture of gun carriages to the government for
use in the Spanish-American war). See also Wise v. United States, 249 U.S.361 (1919);
Sun Printing and Publishing v. Moore, 183 U.S. 642 (1902).
121. See Jaquith v. Hudson, 5 Mich. 123 (1858).
122. J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note 60, at § 14-31.
123. Id.• See also 5 A CORBIN, supra note 62, at § 1058.
124. See Diamond, The Tort of Bad Faith Breach of Contract: When, If at All,
Should it Be Extended Beyond Insurance Transactions?, 64 MARQ. L. REV. 425 (1981).
125. Guard-Life Corp. v. S. Parker Hardware Mfg. Corp., 50 N.Y.2d 183,406 N.E.2d
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cept to apply to "all advantageous relations, not merely those
that have attained the dignity of an legally enforceable agreement."126 More recently, California further expanded the concept to protecting all areas of foreseeable harm.127
As in the case of injunctive relief, the source of this doctrine
comes from English law. The case of Lumley v. Gye,128 a companion case to Lumley v. Wagner, concluded that interference
with a commercial relationship can give rise to an action in
tort.129 California adopted the Lumley approach in 1941, later
than New York, but gave it a more liberal reading. l3O
Tort protection against interference with contracts would be
a strong deterrent against third parties, such as WCBS who seek
to induce breaches of existing contractual obligations. Damage
recovery would be expanded by the inclusion of punitive damages,l3l or mental suffering,132 and parties like WCBS with even
deeper pockets than the high-priced employee or entertainer
445, 428 N.Y.S.2d 628 (1980). In Guard-Life, the plaintiff entered into a five-year contract with a manufacturer, providing that plaintiff would be the manufacturer's exclusive
distributor in the United States and Canada. Later that year, the defendant, plaintiff's
competitor, entered into negotiations with the manufacturer and ultimately, the manufacturer ended its relations with the plaintiff to make a formal agreement with the defendant to supply defendant with the same materials it supplied plaintiff. After receiving
lost profits from the manufacturer, the plaintiff brought an action against the defendant
for tortious interference with contract. The Court of Appeals ruled that a business competitor is excused from liability for interfering with a contract when the interference is
intended at least in part to advance its competing interests and the means employed are
not wrongful. Also, the court ruled that the tort will not apply to a contract that is
voidable or lacks mutuality.
126. Danforth, Tortious Interference with Contract: A Reassertion of Society's Interest in Commercial Stability and Contractual Integrity, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1491
(1981).
127.Id.
128.. 118 Eng. Rep. 749 (Q.B.1853).
129. The court held that since the inducement by Gye to breach the contract was
used for the indirect purpose of injuring the plaintiff or benefiting the defendant, it was
a malicious act and therefore actionable in tort. Danforth, supra note 126, at 1493.
130. Id. at 1507.
131. See Egan v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 24 Cal. 3d 809, 598 P.2d 452, 157 Cal.
Rptr. 482 (1979); United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Peterson, 91 Nev. 617, 540 P.2d
1070 (1975); Trav~lers Ins. Co v. Montoya, 90 N.M. 556, 566 P.2d 105 (Ct. App. 1977);
See also Diamond, supra note 124, at n.7 (citing Anderson v. Continental Ins. Co., 85
Wis. 2d 675, 271 N.W.2d 368 (1978».
132. See Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co. 9 Cal. 3d 566, 510 P.2d 1032, 108 Cal. Rptr.
480 (1973); Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425, 426 P.2d 173, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13
(1967); Christian v. American Home Assurance Co., 577 P.2d 899 (Okla. 1978).
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could learn that negotiating with someone like Wolf during a
"first negotiations/first refusal" period could do more harm than
benefit. Also, managers like Elite, who may induce another manager's client to break his contractual obligations would be liable
for expanded damage liability.
VI. CONCLUSION
Contractual relations are the backbone of a free market society. Personal services contracts involving well-known and highpowered employees have become more important in recent years
as these individuals have gained influence and prestige in their
respective trades. It is imperative to preserve the sanctity of
these agreements, except in cases of fraud, duress or
unconscionability.
Unfortunately, the decisions in Wolf and Wilhelmina, in
failing to grant injunctive relief, do just the opposite as the two
courts permitted breaches of contractual obligations without any
punishment. To rectify this problem, new approaches to expand
damage remedies may be the best solution - not only for the
aggrieved employers, but for society as well.
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